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ABSTRACT 
 
For the period 2002-2005, we examine a sample of 131 end-of-year observations for 57 banks that 
participate in the credit derivatives market.  We find that buyers of credit protection tend to be 
loan sellers and may have a comparative advantage in loan origination, while credit protection 
sellers tend to be loan buyers and may have a comparative advantage in funding loans.  
Furthermore, some net credit protection buyers may derive an advantage as loan originators from 
a high-quality reputation, while others seem to be better able to break down informational 
barriers due to their position as market makers in credit derivatives.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
imilar to loan sales and securitizations, the use of credit derivatives has allowed commercial banks to 
separate the origination of loans from the credit risk exposure associated with the funding and holding of 
loans.  In contrast to interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives
1
 are 
traded by a relatively small number of large commercial banks, other financial institutions, non-financial 
corporations and hedge funds (Brandon and Fernandez, 2005).  Research regarding banks’ use of credit derivatives 
and its consequences has begun, but we are aware of no published work that examines the reasons why some 
commercial banks are net credit protection buyers while others are net credit protection sellers.
2
 
 
 Demsetz (2000) documents that banks specializing in loan sales tend to have a comparative advantage in 
loan originations, while banks specializing in loan purchases tend to have a comparative advantage in funding loans.  
Banks are better able to engage in frequent loan originations when they keep moving credit risks off their books.  
Thus, the loan originators are expected to be more heavily involved not only in loan sales, but also in securitizations 
and the purchase of credit protection.  In contrast, banks that are better at funding loans would be expected to buy 
loans and assume credit risks that others wish to shed by selling credit protection. 
 
 We are unable to compare loan origination amounts or frequencies across banks to verify that net credit 
protection buyers specialize in loan originations while net credit protection sellers specialize in loan funding.  
However, we can identify some characteristics that give banks a competitive edge when negotiating loan terms and, 
thus, make them more likely to specialize in loan originations. 
 
 First, a bank is able to negotiate better loan terms during the loan origination process when it has access to 
inside information about the borrower.  Acharya and Johnson (2007) find evidence of insider trading in the market 
for credit derivatives, which suggests that market makers in credit derivatives have access to more private 
information about a given borrower than non-market-makers or non-users.  The incremental private information 
available to market makers in credit derivatives likely influences the loan terms negotiated by these banks and 
makes them more competitive.
3
  Furthermore, market makers may specialize in loan originations and loan sales, 
S 
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because they are better connected in the financial community and can find buyers for their loans more easily than 
non-market-makers.  We define market makers as those banks that have the largest total notional amounts of credit 
derivatives (amounts where bank is guarantor plus amounts where bank is beneficiary) per dollar of assets. 
 
 Second, a bank with a reputation for high-quality lending is likely able to originate loans with very high-
quality borrowers due to superior screening and monitoring technologies that allow the bank to offer lower rates or 
more attractive loan terms than competing lenders (Ross, 2006).  Highly reputable banks may also be able to charge 
certification premiums as part of the loan rates they offer when they lend to lesser known, high-quality borrowers 
(Cook et al., 2003) and thus have a comparative advantage in loan originations for that reason.  We use ratings from 
Highline Data’s Bank Rating Report as proxies for bank reputation to test if net protection buyers tend to have 
higher bank ratings. 
 
 Consistent with the results of Demsetz (2000), we suggest that net buyers of credit protection similar to 
loan sellers, are better able to negotiate loan terms and originate loans.  We test two independent, not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, hypotheses.  The market maker hypothesis suggests that net buyers of credit protection are 
market makers in credit derivatives and have greater total notional amounts of credit derivatives per dollar of assets 
than net sellers of credit protection.  The reputable lender hypothesis suggests that net buyers of credit protection 
have better reputations (higher ratings) than net sellers of credit protection. 
 
 To test these two hypotheses, we segregate the group of net buyers into those that only buy credit 
protection (referred to as “only buyers”) and those that buy and sell but take net buy positions (referred to as “sell-
buyers”).  The sum of “sell-buyers” and “only buyers” is referred to as “net buyers.”  Similarly, we segregate the 
group of net sellers into those that only sell credit protection (referred to as “only sellers”) and those that buy and 
sell but take net sell positions (referred to as “buy-sellers”).  The sum of “buy-sellers” and “only sellers” is referred 
to as “net sellers.”  We also rank the bank observations by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets and 
identify observations in the top, middle and bottom thirds.  Thus, we are able to compare only buyers and sell-
buyers in the top third of bank observations with only sellers and buy-sellers in the bottom third of bank 
observations. 
 
 Our empirical results are consistent with the notion that net credit protection buyers may be better at 
originating and selling loans, while net credit protection sellers may have a comparative advantage in funding and 
buying loans.  We provide support for both the market maker hypothesis and the reputable lender hypothesis.  Only 
buyers in the top third of net credit protection buyers seem to have higher quality ratings than any of the other credit 
derivative users, even though their asset size is relatively small and they are not among the top market makers in 
credit derivatives.   Sell-buyers in the top third of net credit protection buyers have the largest mean asset size and 
appear to be market makers in credit derivatives.  Their quality ratings are surprisingly low, perhaps because their 
status as market makers allows them to specialize in loan originations in spite of their relatively poor lender 
reputations. 
 
 The following section describes our data and sample selection.  In section 3, we discuss the empirical tests 
and results.  Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.   SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
 Our sample of banks is obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) database for the 
years 2002-2005.  We exclude banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.  The remaining sample 
includes 2891 end-of-year observations of banks engaged in derivative activities as reported in Table 1.  Of these, 
there are 83 observations of net credit protection buyers, 48 observations of net credit protection sellers and 2,760 
observations of non-users, i.e. banks that use in a given year interest rate and/or foreign exchange derivatives, but 
not credit derivatives.  Of the net buyer observations, there are 45 only buyer observations and 38 sell-buyer (those 
that buy and sell credit protection but take net buy positions) observations.  Of the net seller observations, there are 
20 only seller observations and 28 buy-seller (those that buy and sell credit protection but take net sell positions) 
observations. 
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Table 1: Sample of banks engaged in derivative activities, 2002-2005 
 
Sample Banks   2005  2004  2003  2002  Total 
Non-usersa   892  739  633  496  2,760 
 
Sell-buyersb   10  10  11  7  38 
Only buyersc   13  13  12  7  45 
Net buyersd   23  23  23  14  83 
 
Buy-sellerse   9  8  5  6  28 
Only sellersf   5  3  3  9  20 
Net sellersg   14  11  8  15  48 
 
Total    929  773  664  525  2,891 
a Non-users: Banks that do not buy nor sell credit protection (but engaged in other derivative activities). 
b Sell-buyers: Banks that buy and sell credit protection with buy positions exceeding sell positions. 
c Only buyers: Banks that buy (but not sell) credit protection. 
d Net buyers: Sell-buyers plus only buyers. 
e Buy-sellers: Banks that buy and sell credit protection with sell positions exceeding buy positions. 
f Only sellers: Banks that sell (but not buy) credit protection. 
g Net sellers: Buy-sellers plus only sellers. 
 
 A comparison of the observations over time reveals a steady increase in non-user of credit derivatives 
observations from 2002 to 2005.  A relatively large increase in net buyer observations from 2002 to 2003 was 
accompanied by a relatively large decrease in net seller observations during the same time period.  After 2003, the 
number of net buyer observations remained constant.  From 2003-2005, there were increases each year in the 
number of net seller observations until the number of net seller observations in 2005 fell only one short of the 
number of net seller observations in 2002. 
 
 Table 2 lists the names of the 57 banks that took positions in credit derivatives in at least one of the years 
during the 2002-2005 time period.  Credit derivative usage patterns appear to be fairly stable over time, although a 
given bank may change its usage pattern from one year to the next.  Of the 57 banks, 34 banks took credit derivative 
positions in more than one year.  Of those 34 banks, 13 banks changed their usage pattern once during the 2002-
2005 time period.  Only one bank (PNC) changed its credit derivative usage pattern twice during these four years. 
 
3.   Empirical results 
 
3.1   Loan origination versus loan funding 
 
 We first compare selected characteristics of net credit protection buyers with those of net credit protection 
sellers.  We find support for the notion that net credit protection buyers tend to specialize in loan sales and 
securitizations and may have a comparative advantage in loan originations.   Net credit protection sellers appear to 
be more likely to buy and fund loans. 
 
 Tables 3 and 4 show that net credit protection buyers tend to be larger than net credit protection sellers with 
both lower gross loans-to-assets and deposits-to-assets ratios.  Both the means and medians of these variables are 
significantly different in both tables, except for the medians of the gross loans-to-assets ratio in Table 3.  There are 
no significant differences in the proportion of foreign loans (non-US loans/gross loans) held by the two groups.  Net 
buyers may be slightly more diversified across different loan categories than net sellers, but it is only the difference 
between medians in Table 4 that is statistically significant.  Net buyers are more profitable than net sellers with 
significantly higher means and medians for the return-on-assets and the return-on-equity measures reported in both 
Tables 3 and 4.  These tables also show that net buyers derive greater proportions of their revenues from non-interest 
income sources.   This result is consistent with the notion that net buyers of credit protection tend to specialize in 
loan originations, loan sales, securitizations and other off-balance sheet activities.  Consistent with greater 
profitability, net buyers are less levered, with higher equity to asset ratios than net sellers, although the differences 
between the medians of capital ratios are not all statistically significant. 
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Table 2: Sample banks’ credit derivative usage pattern, 2002-2005 
Bank Name     2005  2004  2003  2002 
AmSouth Bank       OB 
Bank Hapoalim B.M.    BS  BS  BS  BS 
Bank Leumi USA     OS  OS  OS  OS 
Bank of America, National Association   SB  SB  SB  SB 
Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi Trust Company  BS  OB  OB 
Bank One, National Association (IL)       SB 
Bank One, National Association (OH)         SB 
Citibank, National Association    SB  SB  BS  BS 
Citizens Bank New Hampshire    OB 
Citizens Bank of Massachusetts   BS  BS  BS  OS 
Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania    BS  BS  BS  BS 
Comerica Bank     SB      OS 
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas   OB  OB  OB  OB 
Enterprise National Bank of Palm Beach     OB  OB  OB 
Fifth Third Bank (MI)    OB  BS 
Fifth Third Bank (OH)    BS  BS 
First American Bank (IA)    OS 
First American Bank (OK)      OS 
First Tennessee Bank, National Association        OS 
Fleet National Bank       BS  SB  SB 
Hanover Bank       OS 
Harris National Association    BS  BS  OS  OS 
HSBC Bank USA (DE)    BS  BS 
HSBC Bank USA (NY)        BS  BS 
JPMorgan Chase Bank (OH)    SB  SB 
JPMorgan Chase Bank (NY)        SB  SB 
Juniper Bank         OB 
Keybank National Association    BS  SB  SB 
LaSalle Bank, National Association   OB 
Mellon Bank, National Association   OB  OB  OB 
Merrill Lynch Bank U.S.A.    OB  OB  OB  SB 
Midwest Bank and Trust Company         OS 
Morgan Stanley Bank     OB  OB  OB  OB 
Mutual Savings Bank    OS 
National Bank of Kansas City    OB 
National City Bank     SB  SB  SB 
National City Bank of Pennsylvania   OB 
Oriental Bank and Trust    OB 
Palmetto State Bank     OB  OB  OB  OB 
PNC Bank, National Association   SB  OB  OB  SB 
Regions Bank     OB 
Standard Federal Bank, National Association        OB 
Sun Trust Bank     SB  SB  SB  OS 
Texas Sate Bank     OS 
The Bank and Trust, s.s.b.      OB  
The Bank of New York    SB  SB  SB  BS 
The Citizens Bank (AR)      OB 
The Citizens Bank (GA)        OB 
The Northern Trust Company    OB  OB  OB  OB 
The Park Avenue Bank, National Association      OS  OS 
The Provident Bank       OB  OB  OB 
U.S. Bank National Association   BS  SB  SB 
Wachovia Bank, National Association    SB  SB  SB  SB 
Wells Fargo, National Association (SD)   SB  SB 
Wells Fargo, National Association (CA)       SB  BS 
Wells Fargo HSBC Trade Bank, N.A.         OS 
Wolf River Community Bank    OS 
Sell-buyers (SB): Banks that buy and sell credit protection with buy positions exceeding sell positions. 
Only buyers (OB): Banks that buy (but not sell) credit protection. 
Buy-sellers (BS): Banks that buy and sell credit protection with sell positions exceeding buy positions. 
Only sellers (OS): Banks that sell (but not buy) credit protection. 
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 Top buyers of credit protection have a significantly higher proportion of commercial and industrial (C&I) 
loans sold and a higher proportion of loans held for sale than top sellers (see Table 4).  C&I loan securitizations are 
also higher but not statistically significant.  Finally, the group of top buyers appears to include market makers in all 
types of derivative contracts (interest rates, foreign exchange and credit derivatives). 
 
 
Table 3: Comparisons of characteristics of net buyers versus net sellers of credit derivatives, 2002-2005 
 
                                                              Net buyersa Net sellersb p-valuesc Net buyers Net sellers   p-valuesd 
                  83 48 83 48 
Variables Means Means Medians Medians 
Total Assets ($mil) 164,885 63,265 0.010 53,557 23,102 0.009 
Gross loans/Assets 52.639 58.387 0.056 55.240 58.320 0.170 
Deposits/Assets 65.457 70.059 0.069 67.800 71.990 0.030 
Non-US loans/Gross Loans 4.762 7.844 0.134 1.988 0.434 0.893 
Loan Herfindahl Index 0.456 0.484  0.385 0.400 0.440 0.132 
Profitability 
Noninterest income/Total income 36.006 22.043 0.000 31.836 19.323 0.000 
Return on assets 1.269 0.761 0.018 1.236 0.903 0.000 
Return on equity 14.513 9.272 0.021 14.702 10.026 0.001 
Capital ratios 
Total risk-based capital ratio 14.665 11.049 0.002 11.892 11.469 0.047 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio 11.796 8.659 0.006 9.193 8.863 0.117 
Core capital ratio 9.774 7.109  0.026 7.103 6.978 0.148 
Loan sale and securitization 
C&I loan securitizations/C&I loans 2.007 0.881 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.111 
C&I loans sold/C&I loans 0.005 0.000  0.074 0.000 0.000 0.021 
Loans held for sale/Gross loans 0.057 0.034 0.185 0.023 0.007 0.002 
Derivative activities 
Interest rate contracts/Assets 495.474 194.308 0.057 55.354 21.103 0.023 
Foreign exchange contracts/Assets 63.878 41.457  0.267 5.384 5.913 0.679 
Notional amt. of credit der./Assetse 17.564 11.405  0.384 3.514 0.683 0.004 
 
a Net buyers: Only buyers + sell-buyers (banks that buy and sell credit protection with buy positions exceeding sell positions). 
b Net sellers: Only sellers + buy-sellers (banks that buy and sell credit protection with sell positions exceeding buy positions). 
c p-values for equality of means. 
d p-values for equality of medians. 
e Notional amount of credit derivatives/Assets. 
 
 
3.2   Market Makers Versus Reputable Lenders 
 
 Given that net credit protection buyers are larger, have lower loans-to-assets ratios, greater proportions of 
non-interest revenue, higher profitability, higher capital ratios and greater proportions of loan sales than net sellers, 
we further test the notion that net credit protection buyers may have a comparative advantage in loan originations.  
To that end, we examine whether the group of net buyers is homogeneous or whether we can identify sub-samples 
within this group. 
 
 Table 5 sheds light on differences between only buyers and sell-buyers of credit protection.  Sell-buyers are 
significantly larger than only buyers and more diversified across different loan categories.  While both sub-groups 
have similar deposits-to-assets ratios, only buyers have significantly lower loans-to-asset ratios.  The proportion of 
non-US loans is greater for sell-buyers, but only the difference in medians is statistically significant.  Only buyers 
appear to derive a higher proportion of their revenues from non-interest sources, but the differences in means and 
medians are not statistically significant.  Returns on assets and equity are not significantly different.  Interestingly, 
only buyers have significantly higher capital ratios suggesting that only buyers may be higher quality lenders than 
sell-buyers.  However, there is no clear difference between the two groups in C&I loan securitizations, the 
proportion of C&I loans sold or the proportion of loans held for sale.  Finally, there is a substantial difference in the 
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extent to which the two sub-groups are involved in derivatives activities.  Sell-buyers appear to be market makers in 
interest rate, foreign exchange and credit derivative contracts, while only buyers’ involvement is significantly 
weaker in all three derivative markets. 
 
 
Table 4: Comparisons of characteristics of top buyers versus top sellers of credit derivatives, 2002-2005 
 
                                                                  Top buyersa Top sellersb p-valuesc Top buyers Top sellers p-valuesd 
  44 44 44 44 
Variables Means Means Medians Medians 
Total Assets ($mil) 251,021 68,299 0.001 72,435 26,065 0.000 
Gross loans/Assets 47.726 56.736 0.005 52.112 57.106 0.016 
Deposits/Assets 61.953 69.246 0.010 63.071  70.620 0.002 
Non-US loans/Gross Loans 6.996 8.557  0.574 4.783 3.035 0.202 
Loan Herfindahl Index 0.421 0.473  0.152 0.379 0.433 0.025 
Profitability 
Noninterest income/Total income 40.334 23.168 0.000 36.769 21.040 0.000 
Return on assets 1.249 0.761  0.004 1.231 0.903 0.002 
Return on equity 14.073 9.452 0.052 13.989 10.026 0.056 
Capital ratios 
Total risk-based capital ratio 15.882 10.844 0.002 11.801 11.428 0.044 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio 12.482 8.430 0.007 8.820 8.863 0.217 
Core capital ratio 11.158 6.983  0.012 7.009 6.820 0.285 
Loan sale and securitization 
C&I loan securitizations/C&I loans 3.754 0.961  0.166 0.000 0.000 0.007 
C&I loans sold/C&I loans 0.009 0.000  0.021 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Loans held for sale/Gross loans 0.085 0.037 0.042 0.049 0.002 0.000 
Derivative activities 
Interest rate contracts/Assets 881.591 211.692  0.002 206.046 31.286 0.000 
Foreign exchange contracts/Assets 109.017 45.139  0.019 23.484 6.933 0.029 
Notional amt. of credit der./Assetse 29.700 12.424  0.079 8.916 0.949 0.000 
 
a Top buyers: Top third of bank observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets. 
b Top sellers: Bottom third of bank observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets. 
c p-values for equality of means. 
d p-values for equality of medians. 
e Notional amount of credit derivatives/Assets. 
 
 
 Suspecting that the sources of net buyers’ competitive advantage as loan originators may be different for 
the only buyers versus the sell-buyers, we report in Table 6 the Highline Data’s bank quality ratings4 and the extent 
of banks’ involvement in credit derivatives for different sub-groups of our sample.  Table 6 shows that sell-buyers in 
the top third of bank observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets are, by far, the largest 
banks in our sample.  However, their mean quality ratings are just barely above those of the only sellers, which are 
the lowest among all sub-group mean ratings.  Yet, the top sell-buyers have the highest mean ratios of total notional 
amount of credit derivatives per dollar of assets and per dollar of loans.  This group appears to represent the market 
makers in the credit derivatives market. 
 
 Only buyers in the top third of bank observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets 
are much smaller, on average, than sell-buyers and buy-sellers.  Yet, they have the highest mean quality ratings in 
the sample.  While they cannot be considered market makers in credit derivatives, only buyers stand out as high-
quality lenders, a status that undoubtedly enables them to attract high-quality borrowers and, most likely, facilitates 
the setting of competitive lending terms. 
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3.3   Regression Results 
 
 To support our previous results, we regress net credit protection purchased against proxies for market 
maker status, lender reputation, and loan sales.  We also include the Loan Herfindahl Index as a measure of 
diversification across different loan categories to control for the return variability of a bank’s loan portfolio.  The 
regression model is as follows: 
 
NETBUY = 0 + 1 DNOTITOP + 2 DRANKTOP + 3 LOANSALE + 4 HLOAN +   (1) 
 
 The dependent variable is net credit protection bought per dollar of assets (NETBUY).  The first 
independent variable is our proxy for market maker status, DNOTITOP, which is a dummy taking the value of one 
when bank observations are in the top 20 percent of observations ranked by the total notional amount of credit 
derivatives per dollar of assets, and zero otherwise.  To identify the highest-quality lender reputations, we use the 
second dummy variable, DRANKTOP, which equals one when bank observations are in the top 20 percent of 
observations ranked by Highline Data’s National Ranking.  Our proxy for loan sales is the variable, LOANSALE, 
which is defined as loans held for sale divided by gross loans.  Finally, HLOAN is the Loan Herfindahl Index. 
 
 
Table 5: Comparisons of characteristics of sell-buyers versus only buyers of credit derivatives, 2002-2005 
                                                               Sell-buyersa Only buyersb p-valuesc  Sell-buyers Only buyers p-valuesd 
                                                                     44 44 44 44 
Variables                                                Means Means Medians  Medians 
Total Assets ($mil) 331,125 24,505 0.000 193,351 16,980 0.000 
Gross loans/Assets 58.322 47.840  0.007 58.350 54.147 0.018 
Deposits/Assets 65.910 65.074  0.791 68.717  63.669 0.862 
Non-US loans/Gross Loans 5.812 3.875 0.226 4.783 0.692 0.001 
Loan Herfindahl Index 0.376 0.524 0.000 0.372 0.488 0.001 
Profitability 
Noninterest income/Total income 34.297 37.449  0.441 31.636  40.259 0.728 
Return on assets 1.302 1.241  0.839 1.243 1.226 0.742 
Return on equity 16.235 13.058 0.298 14.618 14.719 0.342 
Capital ratios 
Total risk-based capital ratio 11.350 17.465 0.000 11.186 12.991 0.000 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio 8.032 14.975 0.000 8.050 10.889 0.000 
Core capital ratio 6.773 12.309 0.001 6.571 8.602 0.000 
Loan sale and securitization 
C&I loan securitizations/C&I loans 1.371 2.557 0.560 0.000 0.000 0.002 
C&I loans sold/C&I loans 0.004 0.006 0.711 0.000 0.000 0.028 
Loans held for sale/Gross loans 0.049 0.064 0.425 0.040 0.003 0.038 
Derivative activities 
Interest rate contracts/Assets 1,039.773 35.844  0.000 493.968 18.078 0.000 
Foreign exchange contracts/Assets 103.041 30.806 0.005 123.484 0.035 0.000 
Notional amt. of credit der./Assetse 29.474 17.507 0.008 3.570 3.514 0.156 
 
a Sell-buyers: Banks that buy and sell credit protection with buy positions exceeding sell positions. 
b Only buyers: Banks that buy (but do not sell) credit protection. 
c p-values for equality of means. 
d p-values for equality of medians. 
e Notional amount of credit derivatives/Assets. 
 
 
 The regression results are presented in Table 7.  As expected, all four explanatory variables are positive and 
significant.  DNOTITOP, DRANKTOP and HLOAN are significant at the 1 percent level while the variable 
LOANSALE is significant at the 10 percent level.  The adjusted R
2
 equals .330.  These results are consistent with a 
positive relationship between loan sales and net purchases of credit protection for credit derivative users, with higher 
intercepts for both high-quality lenders and market makers, two sub-samples of banks which likely act as loan 
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originators.  Market makers appear to have a higher intercept than high-quality lenders which, in turn, have a higher 
intercept than all other users of credit derivatives.  In other words, market makers appear to buy the most net credit 
protection per dollar of assets, even among the group of banks that likely specializes in loan originations.  A possible 
explanation may be that the market makers, which consist mostly of large, well-diversified top sell-buyers, take on 
higher financial and credit risks than the smaller, less diversified high-quality lenders, which consist mostly of top 
only buyers.
5
  Controlling for other financial and credit risks with the rating dummy, DRANKTOP, our regression 
results suggest that greater diversification reduces the need for credit protection. 
 
Table 6: Banks’s quality ratings and their credit derivative usage pattern, 2002-2005 
                                                               Number of Asset National Peer N. Amt. N. Amt. 
                                                             Observations Size Rating Rating Cre. Der.  Cre. Der. 
Banks                                                                                  ($mil) to Assetsg  to Loansh 
Top sell-buyersa 24 432,244 39.167 37.458 46.094  106.741 
Top only buyersb 20 33,553 69.150  64.650 10.025  22.785 
 
Mid sell-buyersc 14 157,778 54.143  49.786 0.983  1.303 
Mid only buyersd 25 17,267 44.560  41.640 5.492  13.391 
 
Buy-sellerse 28 98,694 45.292  42.667 18.384  31.471 
Only sellersf 20 13,665 34.700  35.250 1.634  5.178 
 
P-values for equality of means 0.0000 0.0002  0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
 
aTop sell-buyers: banks that buy and sell credit protection with buy positions exceeding sell positions in the top third of bank 
observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets. 
bTop only buyers: banks that buy (but not sell) credit protection in the top third of bank observations ranked by net credit 
protection bought per dollar of assets. 
cMid sell-buyers: banks that buy and sell credit protection with buy positions exceeding sell positions in the middle third of bank 
observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets. 
dMid only buyers: banks that buy (but not sell) credit protection in the middle third of bank observations ranked by net credit 
protection bought per dollar of assets. 
eBuy-sellers: banks that buy and sell credit protection with sell positions exceeding buy positions in the bottom third of bank 
observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of assets. 
fOnly sellers: banks that sell (but not buy) credit protection in the bottom third of bank observations ranked by net credit 
protection bought per dollar of assets. 
gNotional amount of credit derivatives/Assets. 
hNotional amount of credit derivatives/Loans. 
 
Table 7: Regression results for the dependent variable NETBUYa 
Independent Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Constant -7. 891 -4.156* 0.0000 
DNOTITOPb 7.594 4.687* 0.0000 
DRANKTOPc 4.924 3.034* 0.0029 
LOANSALEd 12.474 1.739** 0.0845 
HLOANe 16.403 4.051* 0.0000 
R2: 0.351; Adjusted R2: 0.330 
F-statistic from regression: 16.505 
Probability of F-statistic from regression: p < 0.0000 
 
aNETBUY: Net credit protection bought per dollar of assets. 
bDNOTITOP: Dummy taking a value of one when bank observations are in the top 20 percent of observations ranked by the total 
notional amount of credit derivatives per dollar of assets, and zero otherwise. 
cDRANKTOP: Dummy taking a value of one when bank observations are in the top 20 percent of observations ranked by 
Highline Data’s National Ranking, and zero otherwise. 
dLOANSALE: Loans held for sale/Gross loans. 
eHLOAN: Loan Herfindahl Index. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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 In summary, our results support the notion that the greatest net buyers of credit protection tend to be market 
makers in credit derivatives, or banks with reputations as high-quality lenders, that are likely to specialize in loan 
originations and loan sales.  The net sellers of credit protection tend to be smaller, or lack high-quality reputations.  
These banks are more likely to buy and fund loans originated by others. 
 
4.   SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 We investigate why some banks are net buyers of credit protection while others are net sellers of credit 
protection.  Using a sample of 131 bank observations involving the use of credit derivatives over the 2002-2005 time 
period, we find support for the notion that net credit protection buyers are more heavily involved in loan sales and 
may specialize in loan originations, while net credit protection sellers are more likely to buy and fund loans. 
 
 Our results further suggest that only buyers and sell-buyers (those that buy and sell but take net buy 
positions) of credit protection in the top third of observations ranked by net credit protection bought per dollar of 
assets and may derive a competitive advantage as loan originators from different sources.  Only buyers may be 
better able to attract high-quality borrowers on more favorable lending terms than their peers due to a superior 
reputation for high-quality lending.  Sell-buyers may be better negotiators of lending terms due to the fact that, as 
market makers in credit derivatives, they enjoy access to inside information that is unavailable to their peers.  
Furthermore, these banks are likely to be better connected in the financial community and, thus, have an advantage 
in placing loans with third parties. 
 
 To further test whether banks specialize in different lending functions (e.g. loan originations versus loan 
funding) and whether this specialization is reflected in different credit derivative usage patterns, it would be useful 
to establish links between the lending terms a bank negotiates and its use of credit derivatives.  Further research is 
also needed to establish whether banks that specialize in different lending functions are different with respect to their 
exposures to risk.  And finally, one might investigate how and why a given bank’s credit derivative usage pattern 
and functional specialization change over time. 
 
NOTES 
 
1
 Credit derivatives are off-balance sheet arrangements allowing the credit risk of an asset to be transferred from one 
party (the beneficiary or buyer of credit protection) to another (the guarantor or seller of credit protection) with 
payoffs depending on the occurrence of a credit event, such as failure to pay or restructuring.  The two main types of 
credit derivatives are credit default swaps (CDS) and synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  See Neftci 
(2004) for definitions of these financial products. 
 
2
 A related paper by Minton et al. (2008) analyzes the characteristics of net credit protection buyers and finds that 
they typically are heavily involved in commercial and industrial (C&I) lending and tend to use other methods of 
transferring credit risk, such as asset securitization.  Hirtle (2007) reports that banks’ ability to purchase credit 
protection has increased the credit supply particularly to large term borrowers.  While the scope of our research is 
different, our results are consistent with those reported by these two studies. 
 
3
 Norden and Wagner (2007) document a positive relationship between changes in the spreads of credit default 
swaps and subsequent changes in aggregate corporate loan spreads. 
 
4
 Highline Data’s Bank Rating Guidelines provide a composite rating of a bank’s health based on an analysis of 
financial ratios from four of the five CAMEL factors: Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Earnings, and Liquidity.  
The National Rating ranks a bank relative to all other banks in the nation.  The Peer Rating ranks a bank relative to 
banks of similar asset size. 
 
5
 This explanation is consistent with the results of Demsetz and Strahan (1997), who document that greater 
diversification leads banks to take on higher credit and financial risks.  It is also consistent with the relatively low 
Highline ratings reported for top sell-buyers in our Table 6. 
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